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Which Way Lesotho? 25
Background
Democratisation in South Africa in 1994 has hitherto brought about many a problem for the tiny Kingdom o f Lesotho. W hile during the apartheid regim e, Lesotho used to enjoy a special place in the United N ations O rganisation and the international com munity at large as the fragile state desperate for survival and protection o f its unitary state sovereignty "whithin the belly" o f its more powerful police state o f the Republic o f South Africa; after 1994, this special treatm ent has waned and Lesotho largely has to make it (alone?) somehow. 
N egative Scenario
On its part, dem ocratic South A frica has added salt to wound. First, shortly after the com ing into pow er o f the A frican N ational Congress (A NC) led governm ent in April 1994, Lesotho experienced a palace coup in August, 1994. The then King o f Lesotho Letsie III, uniletarally declared the B asutoland Congress Party (BCP) governm ent dissolved and replaced it with his own self-appointed governm ent, called Provisional Council o f State com posed o f six people -w hat was generally referred to as the "Six Pack" governm ent in public circles in Lesotho. M uch has been w ritten about this political crisis in Lesotho (See M atlosa, 1994; Sekatle 1994; Southall & Petlane, 1995) . D uring this crisis, the South A frican D efence Force, (SAD F) made several m ilitary air acrobatics into Lesotho along the border and over M aseru.
Com plaint sent to the governm ent o f South A frica by Lesotho about these acts was met with mockery that the boys were just doing some military exercises. O f course, these acts by the SADF constituted violation o f Lesotho's sovereignty over its air space. Second, in January, 1995, the now late King M oshoeshoe II was returned to the throne. Much debate and controversies took place over the constitutionality o f the rethronm ent. These controversies clim axed with one M osotho man, who happened to be a lawyer and the then President o f the Law society o f Lesotho, launching a legal case against the governm ent o f Lesotho for having rethroned King M oshoeshoe II unconstitutionally. This case dragged for a long tim e and threatened to spark o ff instability in Lesotho. A gain South Africa came into Lesotho and unilaterally took the said man to Pretoria for official reprim and (M irror, 1995 a). Through this act, again democratic South A frica underm ined the sovereignty o f Lesotho and the power o f the then BCP-led governm ent in that it was by-passed in this matter.
Third, in April, 1995, the governm ent o f South A frica struck an agreem ent with the N ational Union o f M inew orkers (NUM ), a South A frican Trade U nion, to grant some SADC m igrants including Basotho m inew orkers and those em ployed in other sectors o f South A frica econom y, over the past five (5) years starting from 1995 backw ards, the status o f perm anent residents and that o f full citizenship after a period o f 5 years had been served as perm anent resident by one. N o negotiations were held with the governm ent o f Lesotho on this South Africa -N U M hatched scheme. M uch debate existed about this act by the South African governm ent and its potential im pact on Lesotho's econom y (see M atlosa, 1996; Gill, 1996; W eisfelder, 1997) . Again, Lesotho's sovereignty was tarnished and so was the face o f the governm ent o f Lesotho by South A frica's behaviour not using bilateral official channels to discuss this very im portant issue.
Fourth, South A frica has been w orking on the schem e to have the present borders removed. Governm ent o f Lesotho is not in favour o f the idea. However, South Africa has had its own com m ission looking into this m atter and the proposed scenario is that the border gates on the South A frica side be left open, so that, people can pass.
Fifth, after dem ocratisation, the Southern A frican D evelopm ent Comm unity (SAD C) countries openly recognized, in line w ith the rest o f the world com m unity, free education for all in South Africa. Some o f these governm ents began to actively encourage and give financial support to students in their countries to go to South Africa for specialised and higher education not available at home. Paterson and Rouhani (1996) provide a useful statistical evidence o f the m agnitude o f this phenom enon w hich they call "foreign students at South A frican Universities" and the im plications it has for South Africa. One o f the biggest com plaints by South A frica was that it (South A frica) is at present not changing special rates on fees to foreign students and therefore directly subsidises their education in South A frica -a situation w hich is deem ed unaffordable at present, given budget cuts by governm ent to tertiary education. The SADC countries were therefore asked by South A frica to discuss a Draft Protocol on Education and Training for SADC that w ould facilitate m em ber states to share accountability on tertiary education provision for SADC not later than June, 1997. This protocol was ratified by SADC m em ber states in 2000.
Lesotho features high in the list (fourth) o f countries sending students to South Africa for specialized and higher education -an average o f 155 in 1992. Since 1994 when dem ocratisation took place this num ber has gone higher and stood at more than 10,000 in 2000 South Africa's insistance that it charge an 'enhanced' rate o f fees to foreign students, affected Lesotho negatively because the per capita cost to higher education increased. A verage per capita costs for Lesotho students stood at about M l 0,000 and R20,000 for undergraduate and postgraduate students respectively in 1998 (M ashinini and M ashinini, 2003) . Vol. 5 No. 1 and 2
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Positive Scenario
Not all acts com m itted by South Africa have been negative to Lesotho.
Indeed, there have been many politically and econom ically highly significant endeavours which the form er has done to salvage Lesotho's seemingly endless stream o f crises. First, South A frica together with Botswana and Zim babw e played a leading role in the restoration o f the dem ocratically elected BCP governm ent in Lesotho when it was outsed by King Letsie III in August, 1994 . This contribution by South Africa, inter alia, insured the return o f social stability which had particularly been shaken as the Lesotho Defence Force m assacred five (5) innocent Basotho civilians in a dem onstration to the palace against the Palace Coup. South Africa is, in fact, one o f the three "quarantor states" to Lesotho's stability since then to date (M atlosa, 1994) .
Second, South Africa, Botswana and Zim babw e played a key role to ensure that King M oshoeshoe II was rethroned on 25th January, 1995 January, (W esfelder, 1997 . As M irror (1995 b :l) put it " a tug o f w ar is finally over between the Royal Family and the governm ent after the pressure the three presidents o f the neighbouring states have forced on the governm ent to reinstate the king."
Third, in January, 1994, the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) made a mutiny against the government in dem and for a pay rise o f 100%. Failure to resolve this issue tim eously on the part o f the governm ent o f Lesotho, led to a w orsening o f crisis to a point where the LDF got divided between those in favour o f continued strike action, nam ely, those based at the M akoanyane barracks visa-vis those who w anted a return to work, nam ely, those based at the Ram atjom ose barracks. This disagreem ent becam e so serious that the two platoons took to the tops o f the hills adjacent to their respective barracks and launched mortar attacks at each other. M uch dam age to both lives and property was incurred. M atlosa (1994:226) estim ates that five (5) lives were lost and 11 people injured. It took the intervention o f the three "guarantor states" of Botsw ana, Zim babw e, South Africa, the C om m onwealth Seventh, on M onday the 9th June, 1997, Dr. N tsu M okhehle, the then Leader o f the BCP and Prime M inister, called a press conference in w hich he announced, first, his resignation from the BCP; second, that he had formed a new political party on Saturday, 7th June, 1997, called the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD); and surprisingly, that he and those w ith w hom they have formed LCD in parliam ent were 40 and constituted a m ajority in parliam ent; therefore, according to the constitution, that autom atically entitled him not only to rem ain the Prim e M inister o f Lesotho, but, to transfer the BCP governm ent to his side so that it became the LCD that governed legitim ately (Southal and Fox, 1999; M atlosa, 1997) .
This declaration by Dr. N tsu M okhehle was widely condem ned by the BCP, leaders o f various parties in Lesotho, the international community and indeed the nation at large, save, those who had loyalty to N tsu M okhehle (M atlosa, 1997) . In reality M okhehle's act am ounted to theft o f BCP governm ent in a m ore subtle m anner, but that w hich was rem iniscent o f the way the BNP stole the BCP governm ent in 1970 (K haketla, 1971 ).
M okhehle m ade a "constitutional coup" against the BCP governm ent and ruled through the LCD until the general election o f 1998. The election outcome w hich favored the LCD was disputed by other parties and resulted in violence and dam age to property w orth two billion M aloti and loss o f many lives (Southal and Fox, 1999; M ashinini and De V illiers, 2001) . A gain the SADC intervention through South A frica and B otsw ana m ilitary forces intervened at high cost to restore stability in Lesotho (Southal and Fox, 1999; LSSJ; 1999) . Until today, the SADC m inisters for foreign affairs, headed by the South A frican foreign M inister, have since 1998 been engaged in a tireless effort to assist the Interim Political A uthority (IPA) to prepare for the re-election envisaged for som etim e in
2002.
The unfolding scenarios charted above in relation to the post apartheid South A frica-Lesotho relations since 1994 has, more than ever before, convinced some politicians, students o f international relations; those o f Political G eography, and those o f Southern A frican Studies, and indeed interested observers from the public m ilieu, that the future o f Lesotho lies now here else than in forging an integration w ith post-apartheid South Africa. The lead in thinking about Lesotho's future after apartheid was taken by the National U niversity o f Lesotho, through the Institute o f Southern African Studies (ISAS) and the D epartm ent o f Political and Adm inistrative Studies w hich organised a series o f sem inars and conferences since the late 1980's into the early 1990's. These conferences were largely, but not exclusively, supported from the Swedish G overnm ent financially and resulted in an im portant book publication by Sejanam ane & Santho (1991) . Other important contributions to this debate have been advanced by Sethala (1990) ; M ahao (1991); Southall (1991) ; Molise and M uller (1991) ; Lemon (1996) ; Love (1995; LUTARU, 1996) .
2.
Lesotho's incorporation into South Africa: a historical overview
The idea that Lesotho's future lies in its incorporation into its bigger, more econom ically and politically powerful neighbour, South Africa, is not new. Com m enting on this issue of incorportation, the editorial o f Sethala (1990:19) M arquard, 1971; Stevens, 1972; Eloff, 1979; Lemon, 1996 am ong others). C om m enting on the issue o f incorporation, Eloff (1979:37-39) It might be noted that the history o f co-existence betw een these two countries since 1910 to date has been that o f dichotom ous parallel thinking on this issue. On its part South A frica o f the pastapartheid years and that o f today's dem ocratic era has continued to display an attitude o f treating Lesotho like any o f its part at its convenience while the latter has relentlessly struggled to m aintain its unitary sovereignity while at the same time continuing to be dependent on South Africa.
3.
The debate
Contem porary day discussions on the future o f Lesotho invariably crystallise on two m ajor options, namely the m aintenance o f a unitary state sovereignty by Lesotho and attem pts to enhance its developm ent through negotiations with South A frica for closer regional econom ic arrangem ents vis-a-vis the option that Lesotho forgo its unitary state sovereignty and negotiate for total integration into South A frica to becom e its tenth province or part o f the Free State Province. In this debate there is the antagonistic view point com posed o f those who reject the idea o f incorporation. These are am ong others Lemon (1996; M irror (1995 c); Pitso (1991) ; M irror (1994 a, b, and c). Those who argue for incorporation such as U ND P (1995); Southall (1991); M ofeli (1989) represent the protagonst view point in this debate and point out a num ber o f advantages that Lesotho stands to gain if it were to be incorporated into South Africa.
Firstly, there are econom ic gains that are likely to be enjoyed (Cobbe, 1991). Lesotho's econom ic over dependence on South Africa is in term s o f em ploym ent opportunities.
M ore than 100,000 Basotho were em ployed in South A frica at any point in time in a year as m igrant labours. Since the era o f economic boycotts to the form er apartheid regime in South Africa, Basotho m igrant w orkers have been subjected to continuous retrenchment estim ated at about 3,000 per annum during the early 1990's (M atlosa, 1991) . Those who argue for Lesotho's incorporation into present-day South A frica hope that it might be possible to stop this retrenchm ent and its negative impacts on Lesotho once incorporation is effected, because it would no longer be necessary as all would be South Africans (W eisfelder, 1992) . On their part, the m igrant Basotho workers them selves w ould enjoy full em ploym ent rights with their formerly South A frican co-workers (Cobbe, 1991). There is an assumed free m arket for labour underlying the argum ent advanced above.
It m ust be noted, how ever, that loss o f revenue from the rem ittances will be incurred by Lesotho (M atlosa, 1996; W esfeilder, 1992) . A nother likely econom ic gain m ight be in the field o f industrial development.
Lesotho m ight have industrial developm ent as a result of industrial deconcentration in the heartland o f South A frica to the hinterland o f w hich Lesotho would be a constituent part. M oreover, this industrial developm ent might create linkages effects that m ight stim ulate regional developm ent in Lesotho through raw m aterials such as wool and m ohair production as a result o f dem and from relocated industries that m anufacture wool products. The industrial developm ent within Lesotho w ould lessen the total dependence o f the country on im ports o f all kinds of industrial goods from South Africa and reduce its im port bill. It needs to be noted, how ever, that industrial location is a result of many linkages, both forw ard and backward, rather than policy per se. D espite the long years o f the policy o f decentralised industrial action, South A frica's industrialisation is still centralised. In fact even the few industries that attem pted to relocate to Bantustans closed dow n and left because o f lack o f forward and backward linkages and the general problem o f internal colonialism in intra regional political econom y (Setsabi, 1993) . D ecaying carcasses of these industries can still be seen strewn all over, in places like Botsabelo, Thaba-N chu and Qwa-Q w a in the Free State province, for example. One w onders if Lesotho m ight not experience a similar fate in this regard because it lacks an optim al m ixture o f forward and backw ard linkages and would be politically, and econom ically w eaker than other regions.
Lesotho depends m uch on revenue generated from the Southern African Custom s U nion (SACU).
If Lesotho were to be incorporated into South Africa, this revenue w ould be lost because SACU w ould seize operations with regard to it (Cobbe 1991).
Protagonists argue that Lesotho's natural resources are likely to be developed. O f special im portance in this regard is resuscitation o f the long closed Letseng-la-Terai diam ond mine w hich was run by the De Beers m ining com pany. The Letseng -Terai mine is now opened by a Lesotho company. Possibilities o f opening up diamond m ining operations in other places like Kao, for, instance, exist. The present multi m illion dollar Lesotho H ighlands W ater Project is another natural resource developm ent project o f m ajor econom ic im portance betw een Lesotho and South A frica, during the construction phases o f all the phases o f the projects scheduled to end in the year 2025 (M oeti, 1999) , Lesotho enjoys the Highlands W ater D evelopm ent Fund -an annual sum o f m ore than M60 m illion w hich it uses to finance com m unity-based developm ent projects in the country. W hen the actual transfer and sales o f w ater to South A frica start this fund will stop (M oeti, 1999) . M oreover, around M 20 m illion is received m onthly by Lesotho as paym ent o f the w ater by South Africa. If how ever, Lesotho were to becom e incorporated into South Africa, this revenue m ight be lost because it might not becom e necessary any more for South A frica to pay for the transferred water.
The com m ercial sector has, for a long time, been in the hands o f South A frican based firms. A newly striking feature is that the banking service is also fast reverting back to dom ination by South African banks. Recently Standard bank was replaced in January, 1997 by N edbank. Since 1999, the Lesotho N ational D evelopm ent In any case, on their own accord, many middle and high class Basotho already do heavy investment banking in South Africa instead o f Lesotho because interest rates are higher there. However, this prom otes capital flight out o f Lesotho and butresses its financial and com m ercial dependency (M ashinini and De Villiers, 2001) . Protagonists hope that if Lesotho and South Africa incorporate Lesotho might get a better share from the commercial sector and the present phenom enon o f capital flight through banking would be abated. Protagonists content that all these likely econom ically negative sides o f the proposed incorporation would be over-com pensated for by participation in the sharing o f the larger South A frican econom ic cake to which Lesotho would be entitled (W esfeilder, 1992) .
There are also socio-politically motivated argum ents raised by protagonsits to support the idea o f Lesotho's incorporation into South Africa.
On the political front, an argum ent is made prem ised on the long standing claim by Lesotho to the land lost/conquered and that ceded to the Boers both o f which m ake up part o f today's Free State Province o f South Africa, back to Basotho now that apartheid has collapsed (Lelimo, 1998; Mokuku, 2000) . Both W eisfelder (1992) and M ahao (1995) argue convincingly that such a claim would not be possible under the present O rganization o f African Unity (OAU) charter on international boundaries which is based on the principle o f what W eisfelder (1992: 647) refers to as "uti possidentis" translated to "as you now possess" to which both Lesotho and South A frica are signitaries. A rgum ent is made that, incorporation o f Lesotho into South A frica would be an easier and more w orkable option for Lesotho to have access to this land more especially under the BCP and LCD rule, since the BCP has historically been the party with the slogan "Ea khutla N aha" translated as "the territory shall return" (M ahao, 1995 (PFD & CPU 1995: I) .
From the sociological perspective it is argued that incorporation o f Lesotho into South A frica would reunite the Basotho people in Lesotho and those o f the Free State Province in South A frica with whom they have blood relationships but were separated by the colonial boundaries im posed by the British in collusion w ith the Boers (M okuku, 2000) . O ther sociological elem ents to be gained are said to include, am ong others, access to cheaper and better social services like education. It is noted that many Basotho already send their children to schools with better facilities in South Africa (W entzel, 2001 ). The National M anpow er D evelopm ent Secretariat, a Lesotho governm ent departm ent in charge o f scholarships, financially supports people to study at South A frican Technikons, Colleges and U niversities for specialized and/or higher education not available in Lesotho at present (M ashinini and M ashinini 2003) .
The health services sector offers yet another socially im portant service w hich it is thought Lesotho might stand to gain from (Cobbe, 1991) . At present many Basotho already seek better and specialised medical treatm ent in South A frica (W entzel, 2001) along the border tow ns, in Bloem fontein and B etlhehem in the Free State Province, and M atatiele in the Eastern Cape province. The governm ent ow ned and run Queen Elizabeth II H ospital in M aseru has long standing referral arrangem ents w ith Pelonom i Hospital in Bloem fontein (M ashinini and De V illiers, 2001) .
Protagonists argue that Basotho have in the past, and will in future, continue to build the South A frican econom y, yet they, unlike their co-w orkers in South Africa, are not entitled to old age pension schem es by the governm ent o f South Africa. If, how ever, Lesotho w ere to be incorporated into South Africa, the aged and infirm w ould be legible for social welfare subsidies at par w ith their contem poraries in South Africa (Cobbe, 1991) . However, the question o f social w elfare em oluments, has to be thought out clearly w ithin the context o f the present and likely future third world econom ic environm ent dominated by W orld Bank and International M onetary Fund (IMF) financial lending based on Structural A djustm ent Policies (SAPS) which are contem ptuous of social w elfare and prefer full privatisation o f services.
Perhaps the single m ost important argum ent raised by protagonists relates to the possibility that Basotho o f Lesotho would acquire citizenship as South Africans if Lesotho were to be incorporated (Cobbw, 1991; Southall, 1991) . As citizens o f South Africa, protagonists argue, Basotho would have free movement because the present borders between the two countries w ould be abolished. Basotho would no longer be retrenched at work, they would com pete at par in the labour market; they would get similar pension and old age schemes; they would even have the prerogative to decide to migrate from Lesotho and settle anywhere in South A frica w ith their families if they so wished. The list is not exhaustive o f prom ises to be gained. Basotho's appetites for the lucrativeness o f acquisition o f South A frica citizenship by Basotho was w hetted in April, 1995 by the unilateral decision reached jointly by the South African G overnm ent and its trade union, the N ational Union o f M ineworkers (NUM ), to grant the status o f perm anent residence to all Basotho who have been w orking in South Africa, especially in m ining, five years and backw ards o f 1995 (M okuku, 2000, W eisfelder, 1997) . Some of these prom ises o f possible gains need to be thought out clearly in their proper perspectives.
For exam ple, the phenom enon of retrenchm ent occurred in Lesotho itself w hen SAPS were first adopted in the late eighties (M atlosa, 1990) . M oreover, it is one thing to carry an identification docum ent that declares one either a Perm anent Resident or even citizen o f South Africa; and quite another to get that docum ent to enable one to acquire residential land in South Africa. It needs to be noted that the m ajority o f land in South A frica is privately owned and m echanism s to acquire it for (re-) settlem ent purpose are very difficult. Since independence, the ANC governm ent has been desperately trying to get access to land to effect settlem ent o f black people as prom ised in the Reconstruction and D evelopm ent Program m e (RD P) w ithout much success (N tsebenza and Hendriks, 2000) . H ow then can one hope that an added burden o f people from Lesotho m ight m ake the situation any better? The likely scenario is that people below the middle class in Lesotho -a m ajority at present -m ight m ove from a rural or urban village in Lesotho directly to a squatter cam p in a town o f their preference in South Africa, where the w aiting list for decent housing is already long beyond tolerance levels as shown by the increasing w ave o f "illegal" land occupations by some com munities. The upper and m iddle class cadre in Lesotho are them selves already purchasing houses and even farms anyw here they like in South A frica without incorportation because they can afford the going prices and tenure condition (M urray, 2000) . Some Basotho even have illegal double/dual citizenship in Lesotho and South A frica (M okuku, 2000) .
C onclusion
This paper has attem pted to highlight the fact that South A frica and Lesotho have co-existed throughout their histories to date. This co-existence has how ever, been highly unequal, w ith South A frica not only calling the shots, as it were, but on m any occasions imposing and dictating term s to Lesotho. On its part, Lesotho has always had little choice but to becom e conform ist to South A frica's wishes because o f its econom ic over-dependence on South A frica and fear o f the m ilitary m ight o f the latter (M atlosa, 1997; M achobane, 2001:69-71) .
H owever, the collapse o f apartheid and attainm ent o f dem ocratisation in Southa A frica has sparked o ff both a feeling and desire in some circles w ithin Lesotho that perhaps forging an incorporation into South A frica m ight be the best option to safeguard and spearhead Lesotho's present and future developm ent towards a m ore fruitful and secure direction. The U nited N ations D evelopm ent Program m e (UNDP) (1995: iv) This paper highlights the fact that at present, there is no unanimity on the question o f incorporation within Lesotho. W hile much debate is lively am ong urban-based intellectuals and politicians about this possibility, the ordinary urban and rural Basotho have not yet been form ally consulted to pronounce them selves on this issue. N either has there been a clearly articulated statem ent o f the position o f South A frica on it. A ccording to the ANC (1992), however, Lesotho was not shaded as one o f the ten proposed regions for dem ocratic South Africa. This paper notes with concern, the fact that incorporation of Lesotho into South A frica would imply direct loss o f unitary state sovereignty, nation-statehood and nationalism by Lesotho and all the accom panying rights both international and national that go with the rights o f sovereignty. The paper notes with equal concern, the ever overw helm ing econom ic, social, political and military dependence o f Lesotho on South Africa. The paper concludes that, in order to prom ote an inclusive and conclusive debate, the question o f L esotho's integration/incorporation with South Africa should be subjected to a national referendum .
